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ABSTRACT 
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are widely used in mission-critical systems in the 
Department of Defense and the U.S. Navy. They also form the backbone of national 
critical infrastructure. However, CPS technologies often sacrifice security in exchange for 
increased availability and efficiency, thus becoming prominent targets in cyber-warfare. 
This thesis explored machine learning to develop training examples for intrusion-
detection systems on cyber-physical systems. We developed two generative adversarial 
network (GAN) models and assessed their ability to generate and detect anomalous traffic 
at the packet level. We tested two CPS datasets that included attacks that exploit 
commonly known vulnerabilities in Internet-of-Things networks and industrial control 
systems. The results confirmed that a GAN could improve the performance of intrusion-
detection systems for detecting anomalous CPS traffic. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The security of cyber-physical systems (CPS) is a growing concern as these 
networked systems provide important functions and services to society. Two main 
subcategories of cyber-physical systems are industrial control systems (ICS) and the 
Internet of Things (IoT) [1]. Millions of citizens rely on industrial control systems to 
provide for needs such as water, food, and electricity. Consumerism is experiencing an 
explosion in IoT devices in the form of smart homes, virtual assistants like Alexa or Google 
Home, networked appliances, and other similar products. Because of the conveniences and 
needs they serve, cyber-physical systems and devices have become deeply integrated into 
daily life, industry, and critical functions of the government. For this same reason, cyber-
physical systems have drawn attention as potential targets by both cybersecurity experts 
and malicious adversaries. 
A. MOTIVATION 
Much critical infrastructure in the United States has migrated to cyberspace without 
sufficient security considerations, and continues to be managed with inadequate protection 
against cyber threats. Consumer products are no different, as many IoT devices are 
developed and sold to the public with default security settings or using protocols that are 
well-known to be vulnerable [2]. Furthermore, dangers of these systems are not limited to 
the leakage of information. Insecure infrastructure could harm the public if it were 
suspended, destroyed, or controlled by unauthorized actors. As an example, the Northeast 
Blackout of 2003 lasted two days, left 50 million people without power, caused at least 11 
fatalities, and cost $6 billion. This event was a result of human error and faulty  
equipment [3]. Considering this was the cost of mishandling alone, malicious actors could 
clearly cause more harm to critical infrastructure.  
Attacks on critical infrastructure are not rare. In 2008, the Stuxnet worm 
successfully destroyed the centrifuges in an Iranian nuclear facility and gained international 
attention [4]. This event set a precedent in cyber-weaponization and created an awareness 
that much of this critical infrastructure is open to foreign targeting. In 2018, the FBI 
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announced its detection of Russian cyber actors attacking the U.S. electrical grid and 
aviation facilities [5]. Since 2016, the Mirai worm has targeted insecure IoT devices to 
launch large-scale, distributed denial-of-service attacks [6]. When it was first discovered, 
traffic records indicated that the Mirai botnet had enlisted hundreds of thousands of 
compromised IoT devices [7].  
Due to our considerable dependence on critical infrastructure, disruption to its 
operation risks a high cost to the public. The security requirements of cyber-physical 
systems diverge significantly from the security requirements of traditional computing 
environments due to unique properties of their proprietary protocols and how humans 
interact with them. Time-critical safety measures are especially important for industrial 
control systems. Compared to the security of general-purpose computing and networking 
systems, the security of cyber-physical systems is lagging. 
Machine learning has recently become popular due to its many methods and their 
versatility on a broad variety of data. Many intrusion-detection methods use machine 
learning to understand new trends in network traffic and recognize deviations from normal 
behavior [8]. The method explored in this thesis, called a generative adversarial network 
(GAN), can create useful instances of data for training and testing many applications, 
including intrusion-detection systems for computing environments [9].  
B. RESEARCH PLAN 
This thesis explores a GAN framework for cyber-physical systems in which an 
attacker (the generator) tries to evade detection and generates malicious data that an 
intrusion-detection system (the discriminator) will consider as legitimate. The proposed 
framework, CPSGAN, uses machine learning to improve both the generator and 
discriminator, and simulates a minimax game between them [10]. Minimax games 
incentivize each player to minimize the reward of their opponent with incomplete 
information. Ideally, the adaptive learning of these two players develops a better 
discriminator for defending computer systems, which may reveal obscurities or 
vulnerabilities about the system in question. 
3 
The generator tries to emulate and reproduce behavior classified as non-malicious 
by the discriminator, which we assume uses technology unknown to the generator. In the 
proposed model, the discriminator provides feedback to the generator about the generator’s 
success. Upon receiving this new information, the generator alters its methods. Over time, 
the generator learns what kind of traffic the discriminator will accept, which acts as an 
intrusion-detection system.  
This research investigates different approaches to implement the CPSGAN 
framework. It used long short-term memory (LSTM) neural networks (a specialization of 
the traditional recurrent neural network) and multilayer perceptron (MLP) neural networks 
to prototype the two players in the GAN. Two data corpora tested the efficacy of the 
prototype implementations: an IoT dataset [11] and an industrial network traffic dataset 
from a research system [12].  
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter II surveys GAN technology, 
its use in intrusion-detection systems, and the application of similar neural networks in 
cyber-physical systems. Chapter III describes the threat model, the development of the 
CPSGAN model, and the data for training and testing the generator and discriminator. 
Chapter IV discusses the experimental process and Chapter V shows the results and 
performance analysis of the different CPSGAN prototypes. Finally, Chapter VI 
summarizes this research and recommends future research.  
4 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter surveys machine-learning methods, generative adversarial networks 
(GANs), intrusion-detection systems, and cyber-physical system protocols. It also reviews 
previous work on using generative adversarial networks in computer networking. 
A. NEURAL NETWORKS 
1. Neural Network Basics  
Because they can overcome the disadvantages of existing intrusion-detection 
methods, researchers are exploring artificial neural-network models in cybersecurity 
applications to catch novel attacks [13], [14]. An artificial neural network is modeled on 
the neural connections in the brain and contains simulated neurons that form layers. They 
are also called multilayer perceptron networks [15]. Neural networks usually do supervised 
learning, meaning that they learn from training examples. 
Each neuron has weights on its inputs, which are the most important parameters 
that are varied to allow neural networks to learn. To train a neural network, input is 
subjected to computations in successive layers of neurons until the last layer where a 
numeric prediction is made. We measure how close the prediction is to the correct value 
and use this as training feedback. This feedback travels back through the network and 
changes the neuron weights so that the network can be more accurate in the future. These 
processes are called forward and backward propagation respectively. In backward 
propagation, the feedback is called “error” and updating the weights uses a technique called 
“gradient descent.” In supervised learning, error is computed from labels, which are the 
correct values assigned to samples in a training dataset. 
Before running a neural network, features in the dataset must be chosen that are 
relevant to classification. In intrusion-detection research, feature-selection effectiveness 
can be limited by the developers’ understanding of new attack vectors [14], [16]. This 
means feature selection can be costly and difficult to manage, requiring human expertise 
and detailed analysis. 
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2. Types of Neural Networks 
Many neural-network architectures have been tested in intrusion-detection 
research, including convolutional neural networks, long short-term memory networks, and 
autoencoders. A convolutional neural network is often used for computer vision and image 
processing. The early layers in these networks focus on small local parts of the input, and 
the later layers combine the local parts [17]. Convolutional neural networks could be 
helpful with network packet data because much analysis is needed on small parts of a 
packet before the whole packet can be understood. This architecture can process individual 
packets in series data or segments simultaneously. 
Another consideration is a recurrent neural network, which can remember inputs it 
has previously processed and use them to improve future predictions. A long short-term 
memory (LSTM) network is a type of recurrent neural network used extensively in natural-
language processing. Also called sequence models, LSTM networks were created to have 
more persistent memory. This characteristic helps to recognize network attacks that are 
timing-based, such as flooding attacks [6], [18], [19].  
Unsupervised machine learning could be used to recognize novel attacks. One 
approach is a neural network called an autoencoder, which learns how to efficiently encode 
its input [20]. The first half of its layers comprise an encoder, and the rest comprise a 
decoder. When learning, the autoencoder adds noise to the input or transforms it. Then, the 
autoencoder reconstructs, or decodes, the encoded input [21]. If the result differs from the 
original input, the autoencoder’s weights are changed. To be successful, the hidden layers 
must be adjusted so that the autoencoder can distinguish between the added noise and the 
more important aspects of the dataset. Autoencoders were originally designed for feature 
learning and dimensionality reduction. They have also shown promise as generative neural 
networks, which falls into the same class as GANs [22].  
3. Applying Neural Networks to Intrusion-Detection 
Autoencoder neural networks have been applied to attacks on smart-grid 
technology in [16], where a stacked autoencoder network dynamically identified new 
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system exploits. Adaptability is key to 
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power-grid modernization, which involves restructuring antiquated infrastructure and 
reducing dependency on human operators and developers as much as possible. The stacked 
autoencoder consists of multiple autoencoders, which undergo an unsupervised pre-
training phase and are fine-tuned with a multilayer perceptron classifier at the final layer. 
Once trained, the autoencoder network can be deployed online with real-time data for 
dynamic security monitoring. To assess performance, accuracy can be used, which is the 
proportion of correct predictions over total instances tested. This approach outperformed a 
standalone multilayer perceptron classifier and achieved over 98% accuracy in three out of 
four event types: normal operation with load variation, data injection, and remote tripping 
command injection. With the fourth attack type, relay setting change, the stacked 
autoencoder achieved 94.91% while the multilayer perceptron classifier scored around 
96%. 
Another project applied convolutional neural network (CNN) and long short-term 
memory (LSTM) architecture to data collected from a secure water treatment testbed [14]. 
Their models included several designs of one-dimensional CNNs, a LSTM network, and a 
combined model using both architectures. CNNs and LSTMs can learn important 
characteristics in time-series data [17], [23]. As industrial traffic behavior is more 
predictable than standard network traffic, one could argue that using CNNs and LSTMs 
may work well for this purpose. In this study, the convolutional neural network did best, 
detecting 32 of the 36 attacks examined. By some metrics, performance was better than 
that of a support-vector machine and a graphical model-based approach on the same  
data [14]. The authors showed that their design can be integrated into other ICS intrusion-
detection systems while achieving faster and more accurate results than recurrent network 
implementations. 
In a different study, researchers designed a LSTM network and a combined CNN-
LSTM network for payload-based traffic classification [19]. Payload data was split into 
four-bit slices, organized into sequences, then input to the models. The authors argued that 
the combined CNN-LSTM model would do better than the LSTM-only model. Results 
showed that for all payload sizes, the LSTM model achieved higher accuracy than the 
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combined CNN-LSTM. Other studies have also used LSTM networks for network traffic  
data [6], [18], [24]. 
Another promising method involved a CNN to classify industrial traffic data [25]. 
The CNN’s performance was compared to a support-vector ensemble method, a hidden 
Markov model, and decision-tree method. The authors compared the ability of the models 
to detect six types of ICS attacks, including denial of service, reconnaissance, and several 
subcategories of injection attacks. They achieved the highest recall for five of the seven 
classifications: normal traffic, complex malicious response injections, malicious state 
command injections, parameter command injections, and reconnaissance. The precision of 
the support vector machine, Hidden Markov Model, and decision tree classifiers were 
94.5%, 93.4%, and 93.1% respectively, while the CNN achieved 99.3% precision.  
4. Generative Adversarial Networks  
The generative adversarial network was first introduced as a minimax game 
between two neural networks: a discriminator and a generator [10]. The discriminator is a 
binary classifier that guesses the probability that a sample is from a given classification. 
The generator takes noise, modifies it, and gives the result to the discriminator to classify. 
The purpose of the generator is to learn what the true dataset may look like, which it does 
by observing how the discriminator responds to its generated guesses. If the discriminator 
is not fooled, the generator is penalized by backpropagation. This reinforces the generator 
to make more specific changes to its noise inputs. If the generator is effective at fooling 
the discriminator, the discriminator is penalized in a similar manner.  
The generator does not do very well in early stages of training, especially if the 
dataset contains complex samples, such as images. Since the generator has no knowledge 
of the dataset, it outputs random guesses. Initially, the discriminator can easily distinguish 
between the between the generator’s weak guess and a real sample. As the generator’s 
guesswork begins to improve and resemble real samples from the dataset, the discriminator 
may misclassify the generator’s fakes. When this happens, the discriminator incurs higher 
losses, which force it to learn how to recognize samples from the generator, instead of the 
real dataset. The generator reacts to the discriminator’s improved performance by creating 
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higher-quality samples, and so on. Ideally, training concludes when the discriminator is 
classifying with 50% accuracy and neither network can improve. 
This adversarial process is called a minimax game, a model of strategic tension 
between two decision-makers in a competitive environment [26]. In a minimax game, 
players are risk-averse and make choices that minimize their maximum potential loss. The 
original GAN model involved two competing multilayer perceptron classifiers, but 
effective GAN designs can use any neural network model [22].  
Figure 1 shows the basic structure of the GAN. The generator G takes a noise vector 
z as input to create a fake instance, G(z). The fake instance G(z) and a real sample x are 
input to the discriminator D. The discriminator determines the probability that the instance 
is real, represented as P(y).  
 
Figure 1. The Design of a Generative Adversarial Network.  
Adapted from: [27]. 
Bidirectional generative adversarial networks (BiGAN) include an encoder that 
feeds a sample and its encoding to the discriminator [27]. The encoder is a separate 
component that “mirrors” the generator’s structure, where its layers are in reverse order. 
The discriminator acts as an interface between the generator and encoder during training, 
as in Figure 2. In this case, the encoder E takes real sample x to create the encoding E(x), 
which are both input to the discriminator as a real pairing (x, E(x)). Noise and the sample 
generated from the generator is input to the discriminator as a fake pairing (G(z), z). 
10 
 
Figure 2. The Design of a Bidirectional Generative Adversarial Network. 
Source: [27]. 
The encoder provides the benefit of teaching the discriminator the probability 
distributions of both the real and generated samples. Without a direct connection between 
the generator and encoder, the two must learn the inverse of each other’s distributions 
solely through responses from discriminator. The rigid constraints placed on the generator 
and encoder enable feature learning and emphasize anomalous patterns in the data. 
5. Generative Adversarial Networks in Intrusion Detection 
AnoGAN was the first generative adversarial network to be proposed for anomaly 
detection in image data [28], and was applied to GAN-based intrusion detection in [29]. 
AnoGAN was trained on benign data, then evaluated on benign and diseased medical 
image data. The generator received information about a real instance and, if this was 
anomalous, it would learn to produce a fake benign instance using a technique called 
feature matching. The fake was contrasted with the original input, which highlighted 
specific regions of disease in the original input. A major disadvantage is that AnoGAN 
required a time-consuming backpropagation process to define the mapping for anomaly 
scoring and reconstruction of the image [30]. 
The efficient GAN-Based Anomaly Detection (EGBAD) project used a BiGAN 
design to improve upon the performance of AnoGAN [29]. Both AnoGAN and EGBAD 
were evaluated on the KDD-99 network intrusion dataset [31]. The BiGAN encoder 
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eliminated much of the computation required for the reconstruction and scoring process 
that originally hindered AnoGAN’s training speed. This also increased binary 
classification performance. To evaluate the model, the authors used F1-scoring, which 
accounts for false positives and false negatives more than raw accuracy and provides a 
clearer estimation of performance. Whereas AnoGAN achieved an F1-score of 78.52%, 
EGBAD achieved 93.72% [28].  
In IDSGAN, the generator created malicious instances of traffic and the 
discriminator received responses from a simulated intrusion-detection system as input. The 
model was tested on the NSL-KDD dataset [32]. It was implemented based on a generative 
adversarial network using the performance metric of Wasserstein loss [33], which produces 
an “authenticity” score instead of a probability that an instance belongs to the real dataset. 
In this case, authenticity measures how close to the true distribution the discriminator 
believes the sample to be. This gives the generator much more specific information about 
how to adjust its weights and has the advantage of creating a more stable model [34]. The 
intrusion-detection system was simulated with one of six machine-learning algorithms: a 
support-vector machine, Naive Bayes, linear programming, logistic regression, random 
forest, and K-nearest neighbors.  
The generative adversarial network intrusion-detection system (GIDS) was 
implemented for raw controller area network (CAN) traffic data [13]. The CAN protocol 
is a bus protocol used in automotive vehicles and it resembles industrial control system 
protocols. The authors tested two discriminators. The first discriminator trained on real 
traffic data, both normal and malicious. The second discriminator trained on both real and 
fake data from the generator, which took a combination of noise and normal traffic data as 
input. To assess performance, the authors used accuracy, which is the proportion of correct 
predictions over total instances tested. Results showed that the first discriminator detected 
over 99% of the attack data it was tested on, while the second discriminator achieved over 
98% accuracy for attacks that were previously unknown to the first discriminator. This 
suggests that combining the two discriminators in a defense-in-depth framework would 
bring accuracy closer to 100% in an operational setting. 
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B. CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS 
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) integrate networked physical devices and are 
distinct from general-purpose computing resources. These systems provide many 
commodities and services with minimal human intervention [35]. CPSs are abundant in 
daily life and many common examples exist, such as traffic lights, home security systems, 
and hospital medical equipment. This area can be further categorized into two major 
domains: the Internet of Things (IoT) and the Industrial Internet. IoT is a broad term that 
covers billions of cyber-physical devices online today. The Industrial Internet, which uses 
industrial control systems, includes systems with automated control and production that 
support economic activity.  
1. Internet of Things 
The definition of IoT covers an expansive and fast-growing system of networked 
and embedded technologies. In contrast with general-purpose computers, IoT devices 
handle a discrete set of functions and can be controlled through commands from people, 
sometimes remotely. Unless given explicit instructions to do otherwise, IoT devices 
operate autonomously and use networking protocols to report status updates to human 
operators. In many cases, these devices collaborate with each other to achieve some 
physical objective, as we see in industrial control processes [35]. 
Some IoT devices communicate using telemetry or proprietary protocols built on 
standard network protocols such as the Transport Control Protocol (TCP) or the User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP) [36].  
2. Industrial Control Systems 
An industrial control system (ICS) consists of physical actuators that are controlled 
to achieve some industrial objective, such as manufacturing, energy production, or 
transportation. The term includes supervisory control and data acquisition systems 
(SCADA), distributed control systems, and configurations involving programmable logic 
controllers (PLC). One dataset in this thesis focuses on a SCADA testbed. 
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A SCADA system connects, monitors, and coordinates the control processes of 
geographically distributed systems, which themselves may be distributed control systems. 
SCADAs are like the brain of the ICS body, and the individual systems it commands 
constitute its limbs. PLCs collect data from sensors, control actuators, and can enable time-
sensitive operations and communications across multiple devices. Their main purpose is to 
manage the components affecting a physical process. ICS sensory and device data is 
organized, translated, and communicated between components through a comprehensive 
suite of proprietary protocols. It is also stored for retroactive analysis. To provide control 
at a high level, a human-machine interface (HMI) system communicates with the PLC, 
receives status updates, sends commands to the PLC, or dynamically configures the PLC’s 
control logic. 
The most important design considerations of ICS are timing and control 
complexity, the organizational hierarchy, availability (or reliability), robustness of the 
system when operating in a degraded state or upon system failures, and the ability to detect 
and reduce unsafe conditions [36]. 
a. Industrial Protocols 
One dataset in this thesis was from a testbed using two related protocols: the 
Ethernet Industrial Protocol (EtherNet/IP, also called ENIP) and the Common Industrial 
Protocol (CIP). EtherNet/IP is an application layer protocol that supports industrial-
automation technologies with the Ethernet protocol (IEEE 802.3 using the TCP/IP  
suite) [37]. Its main functions are the organization of data and encapsulation over the lower 
network layers. It supports seamless end-to-end connectivity between components on a 
network [38]. EtherNet/IP belongs to a family of protocols based on the Common Industrial 
Protocol (CIP), which include ControlNet, DeviceNet, and CompoNet. Each supports a 
different type of network or set of operational needs, and all four are supported and 
managed by Open DeviceNet Vendors Association. 
CIP uses an object-oriented design to organize industrial-application data such as 
device profiles or statuses. CIP uses several transport protocols, including ENIP. This 
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protocol follows a producer-consumer model, is media-independent, and was developed to 
provide flexible integration of different network architectures. 
In CIP, device data is organized as an object, and each device is represented as a 
collection of objects belonging to a class. The two kinds of CIP objects are required and 
application [39]. Required objects include connection, TCP/IP, ENIP, and identity objects. 
Application objects relate to a type of device such as water-pressure, temperature, input, 
and output objects. Instances of an object inherit its attributes and properties. For example, 
the identity object of a device would have attributes for its serial number, vendor ID, 
manufacturer, and other identifying characteristics. 
Each CIP object handles either common or object-specific services. Common 
services are predefined and can be generally requested from any object, while object-
specific services are unique to an object type. These services are requested and carried over 
two types of messaging, explicit and implicit [38]. Explicit messages are sent over TCP by 
a server on a request from a client. Explicit messaging often pertains to requests for 
information about the object, instance, attribute of the device. Implicit messages are sent 
over UDP to transport short, predefined data. This information is sent at regular intervals 
to a server [39]. They can be seen as obligatory status updates containing real-time 
information, and are smaller than explicit messages to reduce network burden. 
C. INTRUSION-DETECTION SYSTEMS 
An intrusion-detection system is a network-monitoring application for the 
automatic detection of malicious or unusual activity. Unlike other security applications, an 
intrusion-detection system does not quarantine files or otherwise heal a system, but only 
reports suspicious activity as it is detected. 
The main kinds of intrusion-detection systems are misuse detection and anomaly 
detection [40]. In misuse detection, malicious behavior patterns are predefined and used as 
a basis for monitoring traffic. Misuse detection is often signature-based, where it checks a 
library of known malware signatures [41]. This type of system typically puts little 
processing burden on the host and achieves low false positive rates. While it is effective 
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for detecting known attacks, it cannot catch new exploits, which is an important ability for 
intrusion-detection systems to have.  
Anomaly-detection systems track normal system behavior and flag behavior that 
diverges from this baseline. One subtype is behavior-based detection, which takes 
surrounding context from network traffic into consideration [40]. While anomaly detection 
is more suited for detecting new attack patterns, it has a high rate of false positives 
(behavior mistakenly labeled as malicious). Responding to intrusions can be complicated 
and expensive, so false positives are a more serious concern in cybersecurity than with 
other applications where machine learning is applied [41]. 
Machine learning can develop signatures for misuse-based intrusion-detection 
systems. The closed-loop control processes in cyber-physical environments show 
predictable patterns of behavior that are not as complex as other kinds of network data. 
This suggests that anomaly-based intrusion detection could work well for cyber-physical 
systems. 
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III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND APPROACH 
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) rely on prompt communications and mechanics to 
monitor or control physical processes. This creates security considerations that differ from 
most information technology (IT) systems [35]. With system availability being a high 
priority, efficiency is usually valued over security. CPSGAN could add security to cyber-
physical systems without sacrificing availability. 
A. CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEM SECURITY 
1. Security Issues 
CPS security is affected by legacy infrastructure and timing-control  
requirements [42]. Prompt and accurate messages ensure that CPS operations run 
smoothly, so industry developers emphasize the availability and integrity of data. 
Developers cannot easily apply the same security measures used in IT systems to critical 
physical infrastructure, as ensuring confidentiality in a CPS may hurt efficiency [43]. 
Efficient communications are desirable for most information technology, but they are 
essential in a CPS.  
CPSs can range from a single device to many distributed components [35]. Some 
industrial systems can be 30 years or older and run continuously without downtime, though 
they are expanded with new equipment throughout their life cycles. To integrate new 
components with existing systems, many proprietary protocols provide backwards-
compatibility and flexibility with legacy equipment. Many CPS protocols run over standard 
network protocols, like TCP/IP, and permit text communication of system data. Text 
communication in which data is sent unencrypted make CPS devices particularly 
vulnerable. Challenges can occur when manufacturers discontinue support for legacy 
software or devices. Sometimes, insecure legacy code is replaced by newer code but 
remains on the system and leaves it vulnerable [44].  
Good latency and reliability over the network is needed for the production goals of 
the CPS and to maintain safe conditions. Delayed or lost network data can hurt the 
availability of the system, falsely represent the system’s current state to operators, and put 
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the system into a dangerous state. Corruption of the integrity of messages can expose the 
system to these same risks. Text communications enable the attacker to study the CPS 
network’s communication structure, then spoof other devices or inject malicious 
commands into network traffic.  
2. Attack Methods 
Cyber-physical systems are vulnerable to a broad range of attack  
vectors [4], [36], [45]. The two datasets used in this thesis include reconnaissance activities, 
man-in-the-middle attacks, denial of service, distributed attacks, data exfiltration, and 
physical manipulation of controls. The last means that the attacker has physical access to 
the system and this activity is captured in device-status messages sent over the network. 
All other attacks mentioned may be done remotely.  
Reconnaissance gathers information about a target’s defenses, which attackers use 
to find an undefended entry point using techniques like scanning [46]. Scans involve 
sending packets to provoke a response from a target device [36], causing the device to 
confirm its presence or leak host information through the way it responds. Attackers can 
scan targets with host, port, and operating-system discovery methods using vulnerability 
detection tools like Nmap [47]. Host discovery determines the active IP addresses on a 
network, port discovery reveals which ports on a target device are running vulnerable 
services, and operating-system discovery infers the target’s operating system through a 
process called “fingerprinting.” If intrusion-detection methods flag reconnaissance before 
intrusions occur, it gives incident responders more time to react. 
Man-in-the-middle attacks occur when an attacker can either listen passively or 
change the conversations between two communicating endpoints without detection [4]. 
This is easier when application data is sent unencrypted.  
Denial-of-service attacks target the availability of systems and use large amounts 
of traffic to overwhelm a system or device. Denial-of-service attacks are also called 
“flooding,” and have many variants that exploit different aspects of standard protocols. A 
well-known example called SYN-flooding issues a stream of incomplete connection 
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requests; eventually these half-open connections exceed the server’s memory and cause it 
to crash. 
Distributed denial-of-service attacks exploit multiple machines to generate more 
traffic than a single machine can produce [2]. Some are executed by a botnet, a network of 
compromised machines. The Mirai worm, which primarily targets IoT devices, uses a 
botnet [7].  
Data exfiltration is the unauthorized copying or transferring of protected 
information from a targeted system. Data exfiltration threatens the confidentiality of data 
and occurs with poor data flow controls or insider threats [36]. This is possible through 
some standard protocols with insecure settings, such as using passive mode with the File 
Transfer Protocol (FTP). A high-profile example of exfiltration was executed by the 
Advanced Persistent Threat OilRig (APT 34). OilRig actors wrote malware that used the 
Domain Name System (DNS) and the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) services to 
covertly move data off of compromised machines [48]. 
B. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
We studied two architectures for the CPSGAN model. The first design was based 
on long short-term memory (LSTM) architecture, which is a recurrent neural network [49]. 
We based our second design on a multilayer perceptron network. 
The goal of the CPSGAN generator was to generate packet data that appears benign 
to an intrusion-detection system, which is modeled by the discriminator. The training 
process could create a more resilient discriminator for use in intrusion-detection systems. 
LSTM-based generative adversarial networks (GANs) that process network traffic for 
cyber defense are rare. The ability of LSTM-GANs to detect or produce new anomalous 
patterns have been evaluated on flow-based data [50] and cyber-physical device 
measurements [51], [52]. We used the results of previous work and packet-level LSTM 
classifiers [6], [18], [19] to guide the development of the LSTM-based CPSGAN. 
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1. Long Short-Term Memory in Packet-Level Classification 
Recurrent neural networks can process variable-length inputs and remember 
information from earlier parts of an input sequence to process its latter parts. LSTM 
networks consist of cells, which are gated recurrent units [23], [53]. The gates and point-
wise operations in LSTM cells add or delete information from the LSTM’s cell state. These 
mechanisms are how a LSTM selectively remembers past information [54].  
A LSTM could help intrusion detection because it could remember context in a per-
packet detection method. Several packet-level classifiers used LSTMs in their designs. One 
study split each packet’s header into bytes, encoded the values, then fed the encoded byte 
array into their LSTM classifier [6]. Their input had 54 features, based on the 14-byte 
Ethernet header, the 20-byte IP header, and the 20-byte TCP header. Samples with missing 
headers were padded with 0s. A similar LSTM approach split packet payloads into 4-bit 
chunks [19].  
2. Generative Adversarial Networks as an Intrusion-Detection Method 
The multilayer perceptron GAN is based on the network architecture used in 
PacketCGAN [55]. PacketCGAN could generate several types of packets and claimed to 
enhance encrypted-traffic datasets. The authors extracted packets from packet capture 
(PCAP) files and converted them into arrays of integers, which were then normalized 
between 0 and 1 before input to the discriminator. These are called “packet byte vectors” 
in PacketCGAN. 
In PacketCGAN, the generator had five layers with a total of 2,476 neurons: a 100-
neuron input layer that takes noise, followed by three hidden layers with 128, 256, and 512 
neurons; and a 1480-neuron output layer. “Leaky rectified linear unit” (LeakyReLU) 
activation was applied to the hidden and output layers. The discriminator had five layers 
with a total of 2,377 neurons: a 1480-neuron input layer (matching the size of the 
generator’s output layer), followed by three hidden layers with 512, 256, and 128 neurons; 
and a one-neuron output layer for classification. Both networks were trained using the 
Adam optimization algorithm, cross-entropy loss, and a minibatch size of 64. Each network 
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trained for 200,000 rounds, using a standard GAN-training procedure described in Chapter 
IV, Section C under Training.  
3. Methods 
We used the unsupervised learning technique of principal-component analysis 
(PCA) in a preliminary exploration of our datasets. PCA reduces the dimensionality of data 
and makes trends clearer, which helped us better see attacks that were separable from 
normal traffic. Other programs that supported training, such as the data preprocessor, were 
developed alongside the CPSGAN model. The supporting modules were designed to be 
flexible and suit the needs of the GANs in a “plug and play” manner, such as adapting the 
networks to take data of different shapes or transformations.  
C. DATASETS 
The CPSGAN model was trained and tested against two cyber-physical system 
datasets. The Industrial Control System Instructional Cybersecurity Lab (ICSICL) dataset 
contains traffic data from an NPS industrial control system testbed of the same name [12]. 
The testbed traffic includes communications over the ENIP and CIP protocols described in 
Chapter II. The Internet of Things (IoT) dataset was captured from a network with several 
devices [11]. Both datasets are a collection of PCAP-format serialized data files containing 
packets captured from network traffic.  
1. Industrial Control System Instructional Cybersecurity Lab Dataset 
The testbed environment for the ICSICL dataset used an Allen Bradley 
ControlLogix 1756-L71 chassis containing a 1756-L71 ControlLogix Logix5571  
PLC [57], two ControlLogix Ethernet communication modules (EN2T, EWEB) [58], a 
Prosoft generic serial communications module [59], and several analog and digital input 
and output modules. The development software for these components was Rockwell 
Automation Studio5000 [60], which provided interfaces for control-logic development and 
monitoring devices. The PCAP files were collected on a separate computer connected to 
the ICSICL network using the tool Wireshark [60], which captures packets traveling 
through the network.  
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The ICSICL dataset contains 23 PCAP files that cover five types of traffic: normal 
operations, reconnaissance by HTTP Web activities, unauthorized manipulation of 
physical controls, data exfiltration using FTP file transfer in passive mode, and denial of 
service intended to silently shut down the PLC. The denial-of-service attacks are further 
split into two types that exploited the Register Session and Send Request/Reply Data 
commands. The Register Session denial-of-service capture was truncated to the first 20,000 
packets in our experiments since many more of these packets occurred than the other attack 
types. Details of the attacks observed are listed in Table 1. In total, 80,876 packets were in 
the ICSICL dataset, of which 35,348 were considered malicious. Each packet in the dataset 
was preprocessed, labeled, and then fed into the discriminator during training. Appendix 
A shows examples of benign and malicious traffic in the ICSICL dataset. 
Table 1. ICSICL Dataset: Malicious Traffic Composition 
Category Subcategory Total Packets Attack Packets 
Normal Normal          41,266                       0  
Reconnaissance HTTP          16,061             14,787  
Data Exfiltration FTP Passive Mode            1,177                    55  
Physical Controls Physical Controls               848                  765  
Denial of Service (DoS) Register Session          20,000            19,281 
Send Request/Reply Data            1,524                  460  
 
2. Internet of Things Dataset 
The IoT network intrusion dataset was captured by researchers from the Korea 
University Hacking and Countermeasure Research Lab (HCRL) to support intrusion and 
anomaly detection research. It is available through the IEEE DataPort platform online [11]. 
Two IoT devices, a Bluetooth speaker (SKT NUGU) and a Wi-Fi Camera (EZVIZ), 
simulated the victim or malicious actor in various runs. Some attacks interacted with other 
devices connected to the same network, such as laptops and smartphones.  
The dataset includes 42 PCAP files of benign traffic, scanning, man-in-the-middle 
attacks, denial-of-service attacks, and distributed attacks caused by the Mirai worm. The 
attack categories of the IoT dataset are in Table 2, which gives the number of captured 
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packets and the number of malicious packets for each type of attack. The dataset contains 
2,985,994 packets of which 1,232,845 packets are considered malicious. Each packet in 
the dataset is preprocessed, labeled, and fed into the discriminator during training. 
Table 2. IoT Dataset: Malicious Traffic Composition 
Category Subcategory Total Packets Attack Packets 
Normal Normal 137,396 0 
Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) ARP Spoofing 194,184 101,885 
Denial of Service (DoS) SYN Flooding 141,709 64,646 
Scanning Host Discovery 310,480 3,127 




Mirai Botnet UDP Flooding 1,187,114 949,284 
ACK Flooding 313,462 75,632 
HTTP Flooding 248,294 10,464 









A. MODEL DESIGN 
CPSGAN consists of two neural networks: a generative model (generator) and a 
binary classifier (discriminator). The training of CPSGAN requires two additional 
modules, a preprocessor and a selector, which do packet-data preprocessing and training-
data organization. CPSGAN and its supporting modules are in Figure 3. The preprocessor 
(shown in light blue) parsed packets, extracted features, made transformations to the data, 
and generated class labels for the data. The selector (shown in teal) formatted, shaped, and 
managed sequential inputs to both models. We discuss the data-preparation modules in the 
following sections. All modules shown were written in Python. The generator and 
discriminator were written using the Keras deep learning library [61]. 
 
Figure 3. Overview of the CPSGAN Training Program 
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B. DATA PREPARATION 
1. Packet Structure 
Our approach focused on TCP/IP packet headers, so data preparation involved 
converting raw packet headers to a format that could be input to the discriminator. Packets 
are organized bundles of data that coordinate network communications and interactions 
over the Internet. We can tell which protocols a packet uses by inspecting its headers, which 
contain metadata that help route a packet to its correct destination. Specific metadata, such 
as the protocols used or IP addresses, are in the fields of headers. An example is given in 
Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Packet Structure with Emphasis on the IP Header Fields.  
Adapted from: [62].  
Standards help devices quickly parse and interpret the information in header fields. 
The syntax and semantics of each header field are defined in the Request for Comments 
791 (RFC), which is maintained by the Internet Engineering Task Force [62]. Table 3 
shows the packet header fields that we used for data preprocessing. The operating system 
adds a timestamp for each packet, which is stored with the individual packet in a PCAP 
file. A PCAP file is a serialized file format that contains a sequence of packets from 
captured traffic. Packet captures are taken using a tool like Wireshark [60] that collects 
network traffic as it is received by a network interface card. 
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Table 3. Parsed Header Fields used in CPSGAN 
Packet Data Length (in bytes) 
Packet arrival time N/A 
Packet length 2 
IP-layer protocol 1 
IP address source 4 
IP address destination 4 
Port source 2 
Port destination 2 
TCP Flags  1 
CIP ID Status* 2 
ENIP Command* 2 
ENIP Length* 2 
ENIP Session* 4 
ENIP Status* 4 
ENIP Context* 8 
ENIP Options* 4 
*Fields parsed in the ICSICL dataset only. 
 
2. Preprocessor 
The preprocessor converted raw PCAP contents into data that can be handled by 
the discriminator. A packet capture of an attack may contain a mixture of normal and attack 
traffic. Therefore, we must identify and label each packet as benign or malicious during 
preprocessing. The following tools were used for analyzing and preprocessing our test 
datasets: 
1. TShark [60]: A Wireshark command-line tool that captures and analyzes 
network traffic. For each PCAP file in the dataset, TShark was called from the 
preprocessing program using our Wireshark filter rules written for the specific 
dataset. 
2. Capinfos [60]: A Wireshark command-line tool that returns general information 
about the PCAP file, such as the number of packets it contains and its start and 
end times. 
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3. Numpy [63]: A Python package for array and matrix manipulation. 
4. Pandas [64]: A Python package for array and matrix manipulation,  which can 
also read and save CSV data.  
5. Dpkt [65]: A Python package for reading PCAP files, parsing user-specified 
header fields in packets, and storing the parsed data in a Pandas DataFrame 
data structure. 
We used Wireshark filters to extract only packets that met known characteristics of 
an attack, like the attacker’s IP address or the protocol that was exploited. For the IoT 
dataset, we used the filter rules provided by researchers who collected the PCAP files; we 
wrote our own rules for the ICISCL dataset. Further explanation of the filter rules is in 
Appendix B. Given a directory of PCAP files, the preprocessor applied Wireshark filter 
rules to each PCAP file to separate packets of interest and label them appropriately. Then, 
the preprocessor parsed each packet and extracted the header fields listed in Table 3.  
3. Preprocessor’s Workflow 
In step 1 of Figure 5, the preprocessor called TShark with these rules to separate 
benign and attack packets of a PCAP file into benign traffic and attack traffic. In step 2, 
using the Dpkt Python module, the preprocessor parsed and extracted headers from each 
packet of the two kinds of traffic. The parsed headers of each packet formed a record in the 
preprocessed dataset. If any header fields were missing, the preprocessor padded the record 
with 0’s to make its output consistent in length. The preprocessor then labeled each packet 
in each array with a 0 for benign and 1 for attack and added this as a column to the array. 
After the labels were added, the preprocessor reordered records by timestamp and applied 
any necessary transformations to the data (described below). Reordering enabled testing 
against realistic sequences of traffic, and reordering is needed to compute packet 
interarrival times.  
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Figure 5. Behavior of the Selector 
a. Data Transformation 
The header-field values can be large and of variable length, which is undesirable 
for input to a neural network. For example, timestamps are recorded as UNIX epoch times 
and represent seconds since January 1st, 1970 [66]. We took the difference between 
consecutive packet timestamps and divided them by the maximum difference between 
timestamps to get a number between 0 and 1 [67].  
We split packet data along a byte boundary, using a similar method in [6]. 
Therefore, input to our long short-term memory model consists of features in the range of 
0 to 255. The packet interarrival times, calculated in the previous step, are scaled to a value 
in this range. These integers are “one-hot” encoded or embedded before they are input to 
the LSTM discriminator. One-hot encodings represent nonnumeric features as bit vectors 
with a single one bit. An embedding is an encoding that represents non-numeric features 
with a dense vector of values [18], [68]. We used one-hot encodings for the LSTM-
CPSGAN model and embeddings from the Keras library for the standalone LSTM- 
discriminators [50]. This is because trainable embeddings cannot be placed directly 
between the generator and discriminator. 
For the multilayer perceptron model, we used networking definitions to bin 
nonnumeric categorical data and create bit-mapped data. Table 4 describes the binning of 
the Classful IP addressing scheme [62] and Table 5 shows the binning of TCP/UDP  
ports [69], which we used for categorizing the IP address and TCP/UDP header field 
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values. TCP flags, which are expressed as one byte in the packet data, were separated into 
bit representations to be used as Boolean features. We handled the TCP flags SYN, RST, 
PSH, ACK, URG, ECE, CWR, and NS.  
Table 4. Binning of IP Addresses 
Class IP Address Range 
A 1.0.0.1 to 126.255.255.254 
B 128.1.0.1 to 191.255.255.254 
C 192.0.1.1 to 223.255.254.254 
D 224.0.0.0 to 239.255.255.255 
E 240.0.0.0 to 254.255.255.254 
Table 5. Binning of Port Ranges 
Type Port Number Range 
Well-known 0 to 1023 
Registered 1024 to 49151 
Private 49152 to 65535 
 
Preprocessing extracted 50 features from the ICSICL dataset and 27 features from 
the IoT dataset, in Table 6. We limited features to the header fields in Table 6 because they 
are key for identifying the type of attack and the packets of the attack.  
Because the ICSICL dataset is unbalanced due to the large volume of denial-of-
service packets, we duplicated preprocessed benign packets to create a fuller training set 
for experimentation. This was straightforward for the ICSICL dataset as industrial-
operations network traffic is very repetitive, meaning many packets contain the same 
values for these features.  
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Table 6. Total Number of Features in the ICSICL and IoT Datasets 
ICSICL Features  IoT Features 
Packet arrival time 1  Packet arrival time 1 
Packet length 2  Packet length 1 
IP-layer protocol 1  IP-layer protocol 1 
IP address source 4  IP addresses 5 
IP address destination 4  IP addresses 5 
Port source 2  Port source 3 
Port destination 2  Port destination 3 
TCP Flags  8  TCP Flags  8 
CIP ID Status 2  Total 27 
ENIP Command 2    
ENIP Length 2    
ENIP Session 4    
ENIP Status 4    
ENIP Context 8    
ENIP Options 4    
Total 50    
 
4. Selector 
The selector handled training and testing for CPSGAN by preparing sequences of 
preprocessed traffic data for the discriminator. When training CPSGAN, the selector used 
a batch size of 50 packets. This means for each iteration of training, the selector pulled 50 
packets from the real dataset and 50 fake packets from the generator, then supplied them 
to the discriminator in the order they were captured. Therefore, in each iteration of training 
CPSGAN, the discriminator tried to predict the classifications of 100 packets.  
The selector gave 80% of the real traffic to the discriminator for training and saved 
the other 20% for post-training testing. We wanted both training and testing sets to cover 
as many attack patterns in the dataset as possible. We also did not want to randomize 
individual packets, as this would fully randomize the capture order and remove important 
context for understanding certain attacks. Instead, the selector divided the preprocessed 
dataset into short subsequences, allocated 80% of the subsequences to a training set and 
20% to a testing set, then selected and returned a random subsequence when requested.  
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To expose the models to equal amounts of traffic, each model trained on a 
predetermined number of subsequences from the 80% training set of each dataset. If the 
selector exhausted the training indices before training completed, the selector shuffled the 
subsequences and iterated through the training data in a new order. 
C. CPSGAN 
Although the discriminator in our GAN used supervised learning with labels on 
malicious and benign data, the generator used unsupervised learning. The generator never 
saw the real training dataset and must learn it through incomplete information. Its only 
feedback are the losses backpropagated from the discriminator.  
Each model required a loss function and an optimizer. An optimizer controls the 
method and degree to which weights are changed using the loss function’s calculations. 
The four networks described in this section (i.e., both types of generators and 
discriminators) were trained using binary cross-entropy loss and the Adam optimizer [70] 
with a learning rate of 0.0002. 
The number of features in the dataset determines the dimensions of each model, 
represented as N in this section. The layers in our LSTM model must be defined using N 
as the number of time-steps, where N defines the length of an input sequence and depends 
on the number of features in the dataset. For recurrent neural networks, the value of N 
controls how many parts of the input sequence to run through the LSTM. 
1. Generator 
The generator in a GAN learns a joint probability distribution 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦) =
𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥|𝑦𝑦)𝑝𝑝(𝑦𝑦). But further, its goal is to generate nontrivial outputs that the discriminator 
believes to be benign although they are actually malicious. The hope is that the generator 
could discover a new attack vector; but more importantly, we wanted to strengthen the 
discriminator against unknown types of traffic.  
In both the LSTM and MLP generators, the output layer depended on the number 
of features in the dataset and used the same value of N as the discriminator’s input layer. 
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This allowed the generator to output fake packets with the same dimensions as the real 
packets, which are provided by the selector. 
a. Long Short-Term Memory 
The generator in the long short-term memory (LSTM) design is based on a 
specialized recurrent neural network and is different from the selector. This architecture is 
suited for sequence-based data and pattern-recognition tasks [71], which motivated its 
choice in CPSGAN’s implementation. Both the generator and the discriminator in the 
LSTM-CPSGAN contain bidirectional LSTM layers.  
A single LSTM is a three-layer neural network. A bidirectional LSTM has two 
LSTM networks that run in parallel. While the generator seems to have only one hidden 
layer in Table 7, each LSTM “layer” is truly a group of perceptron layers on the backend 
and is configurable through the Keras application programming interface. 
Table 7. Long Short-Term Memory Generator Parameters 
Layer Type Neurons Activation 
Input Input Layer N None 
Hidden 1 Bidirectional LSTM 256 Sigmoid, Tanh 
Output Dense 256 SoftMax [70] 
 
The value of N specifies the time-steps parameter in the Bidirectional LSTM layer, 
which is not shown for this layer in Table 7 because it does not define the number of 
neurons. Setting the time-steps parameter to N ensures that the generator returns a sequence 
of equal to the length of a packet. The value of 256 in Table 7 corresponds to a one-hot 
encoding’s maximum-length representation for a byte. When given a noise input, the 
generator outputs N one-hot encodings, which represent a packet byte sequence with the 
same dimensions as the input layer of the LSTM discriminator. 
b. Multilayer Perceptron 
The perceptron generator, which is not the same as the selector, produced an 
encoded packet instance for input to the perceptron discriminator. The output layer 
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contained N neurons and output a packet instance, where N is the number of features in the 
dataset. Table 8 summarizes the MLP generator model.  
Table 8. Multilayer Perceptron Generator Parameters 
Layer Type Neurons Activation 
Input Input Layer 50 None 
Hidden 1 Dense 100 ReLU 
Hidden 2 Dense 200 ReLU 
Hidden 3 Dense 400 ReLU 
Hidden 4 Dense 200 ReLU 
Hidden 5 Dense 100 ReLU 
Hidden 6 Dense 50 ReLU 
Output Dense N Tanh 
 
2. Discriminator 
The discriminator is an intrusion-detection mechanism that calculates the 
conditional probability that a packet sample is malicious. One simple approach is that if 
the conditional probability is below 0.5, the sample is classified as real and benign. This is 
the threshold that we used for interpreting predictions. Large probabilities mean that traffic 
was either malicious or produced by the generator, while 0 means that traffic was real and 
benign.  
a. Long Short-Term Memory 
The LSTM discriminator is a classifier with an input layer and three hidden layers: 
a bidirectional LSTM, a standard LSTM, and a fully-connected layer with two neurons. 
The fifth (output) layer is a single predictive node that outputs the probability that an input 
packet is anomalous. We used the value of N to specify the number of time steps for the 
LSTM layers. This tells the network to process inputs up to the length of a packet. This 
value is not included in Table 9 since N does not describe the number of neurons in the 
layer. 
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Table 9. Long Short-Term Memory Discriminator Parameters 
Layer Type Neurons  Activation 
Input Input Layer 256 None 
Hidden 1 Bidirectional LSTM 256 Sigmoid, Tanh 
Hidden 2 LSTM 80 Sigmoid, Tanh 
Hidden 3 Dense 2 Tanh 
Output Dense 1 Sigmoid 
 
The value of 256 in Table 9 is the length of a byte’s one-hot encoding. The LSTM 
discriminator took one-hot encoded packet samples as input. This is passed to a 
bidirectional LSTM layer, which contains a forward LSTM and a backward LSTM [72]. 
The input sequence to the bidirectional LSTM is copied, and the sequential order of this 
copy is reversed. The original sequence is passed through the forward LSTM and the 
reversed sequence is passed through the backward layer. The two outputs from the LSTMs 
are concatenated and passed to the next LSTM, which is unidirectional.  
b. Multilayer Perceptron 
The multilayer perceptron (MLP) discriminator had seven hidden layers. The 
number of neurons in the input layer and the sixth hidden layer are determined by the 
number of features in the dataset, N. The first six hidden layers used a rectified linear unit 
(ReLU) activation [70] and the seventh used a hyperbolic tangent activation (Tanh). A 
rectifier sums the inputs of the neuron and applies linear activation to it if the sum passes 
a given threshold (usually zero, as in this case). The output layer output a predictive value 
between 0 and 1. Table 10 shows the dimensions of the perceptron discriminator.  
  
36 
Table 10. Multilayer Perceptron Discriminator Parameters 
Layer Type Neurons Activation 
Input Input Layer N None 
Hidden 1 Dense 100 ReLU 
Hidden 2 Dense 200 ReLU 
Hidden 3 Dense 400 ReLU 
Hidden 4 Dense 200 ReLU 
Hidden 5 Dense 100 ReLU 
Hidden 6 Dense N ReLU 
Hidden 7 Dense 2 Tanh 
Output Dense 1 Sigmoid 
 
3. Training 
In the training algorithm, the generator and discriminator took turns learning 
(adjusting their weights) [10]. For CPSGAN, the plan was that each iteration of training 
involved these steps: 
1. The generator created packets using noise inputs.  
2. The discriminator was trained on inputs chosen by the selector from either the 
preprocessed dataset or the output of the generator, created in step 1. 
3. The generator’s output layer was connected to the discriminator’s input layer to 
form a single network, the GAN. Noise was input to the generator’s input layer 
and forward-propagated through the GAN. The generator was trained by 
backpropagation from the discriminator within the GAN. 
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In step 1, neither network was trained. The generator only produced some data 
meant to train the discriminator, which did not change the weights of either the 
discriminator or generator (Figure 6). The purpose of this step is to provide fake inputs for 
the selector’s pipeline in step 2. 
In the first few iterations of training, the generator’s output may appear to be 
random guessing (noise). If training was successful, then the generator’s output may take 
a more specific form in later iterations of training. 
 
Figure 6. Step 1 of the CPSGAN Training Procedure 
Step 2 trained the discriminator (Figure 7). The selector provided both real-labeled 
packets from the preprocessed dataset (2a in Figure 7) and crafted packets from the 
generator (2b in Figure 7) to the discriminator. Real packets may have either benign or 
malicious labels, which were determined by the preprocessor. For this step only, all 
generated packets were given malicious labels.  
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Figure 7. Step 2 of the CPSGAN Training Procedure 
In step 3, the generator and discriminator were connected to form a GAN (Figure 
8). The input to the generator of the GAN was noise. It flowed through the generator’s 
layers and computed an instance with the packet parameters described in section 4.B. This 
generated instance was input to the discriminator. The discriminator judged to what degree 
the packet data was generated data or real attack data, which were both labeled as 
“malicious.” We computed the discriminator’s error as one minus the output if the data was 
malicious, and the output alone if the data was real and benign. The resulting error was 
backpropagated through the discriminator first, then through the generator. Thus, the 
generator received indirect feedback from the discriminator. 
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Figure 8. Step 3 of the CPSGAN Training Procedure 
We deactivated weight updates to the discriminator in step 3 so that only the 
generator was updated. Backpropagation calculations still occurred throughout the 
discriminator and affected how the generator’s weights changed, but the discriminator 
retained its original weights after this step. If the discriminator’s judgements of real and 
fake were shifting while the generator was trying to learn, we would have been asking the 
generator to predict a moving target. Our GAN used binary cross-entropy as its loss 
function for both discriminator and generator training. Binary cross-entropy measures the 
distance between a model’s prediction and classification probabilities. This is done by 
taking the logarithm of the error and multiplying it against the ground-truth probability for 
each of the classes (benign and malicious). Loss is the negated sum of these products. Both 
40 
networks want to minimize their respective losses, but the discriminator’s success is the 
generator’s failure and vice versa. This situation describes a minimax game.  
During CPSGAN training, the multilayer perceptron model iterated through 10,000 
rounds of the training procedure. The long short-term model iterates through 5,000 rounds 
of the training procedure. 
D. EXPERIMENTS   
1. Analysis Methods 
For our experiments, we measured accuracy and F1 scores to evaluate our model’s 
performance. They are derived from the number of true positives, false positives, true 
negatives, and false negatives that occurred during testing [18]. True positives (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) are the 
total number of correct predictions of malicious packets the model has made. False 
negatives (𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇) are the number of malicious packets the discriminator did not detect and 
false positives (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) are the number of times the model incorrectly flagged a benign packet 
as malicious. Table 11 summarizes this. 
Table 11. Quantifying the Discriminator’s Predictions 
Truth Predicted Outcome Behavior of Discriminator 
1 1 True Positive An anomalous packet was caught 
0 0 True Negative A benign packet was correctly classified 
1 0 False Negative An anomalous packet was missed 
0 1 False Positive A benign packet was flagged as anomalous 
 
Accuracy describes the proportion of correct predictions over total instances 
observed during testing: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑦𝑦 =
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 + 𝑇𝑇𝐹𝐹 + 𝐹𝐹𝑇𝑇 + 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
 
F1-scores generally provide a better assessment of data with uneven distribution of 
classes than just accuracy alone. To calculate an F1-score, we first compute two relevance 
metrics, precision and recall. With respect to a classification, precision measures the 
41 
proportion of instances that were correctly detected out of all predictions. Recall measures 
the proportion of instances the model correctly detected out of all instances from a given 










2 ∗ 𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑝𝑝𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
 
We also graphed results with receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curves and 
precision-recall curves. Precision-recall curves compare these two statistics across 
different thresholds to visualize performance on imbalanced datasets [73]. ROC curves 
compare the recall (equivalently, the true-positive rate) and the false-positive rate by 
measuring the rate at which the model misclassifies benign samples. The AUROC, or area 







2. Principal-Component Analysis and K-Means Clustering 
Our experimental results were also analyzed with principal-component analysis and 
K-Means clustering. Principal-component analysis is an unsupervised method for finding 
useful linear combinations of numeric features in high-dimensional data [21]. These linear 
combinations are called “principal components” and they compress information about the 
data’s covariance into a smaller dimensional space without losing significant amounts of 
information [67]. We used principal-component analysis to reduce the dimensionality of 
the ICSICL and IoT datasets, then applied K-Means clustering to their resulting principal 
components.  
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Before principal-component analysis, we scaled the data using z-score  
normalization [67], which subtracts the mean and divides by the standard deviation to give 
all variables a zero mean and standard deviation of 1 to make them easier to compare. We 
plotted the two components with the largest explained variance to see whether individual 
attacks were linearly separable from normal network behavior.  
K-Means assigns data points to the cluster with the nearest cluster centroid, then 
recalculates the centroids iteratively. We clustered the dataset transformed by principal-
component analysis with a goal number of clusters equal to the number of traffic types 
(several attack types plus benign traffic). The ICSICL dataset contained six traffic types 
and the IoT dataset contained ten traffic types. We used the performance metrics in Section 
IV.D.1 to assess how well the data was partitioned. 
3. CPSGAN Evaluation 
CPSGAN was evaluated based on its discriminator’s performance as a classifier 
and the generator’s ability to emulate network traffic patterns. The results of K-Means 
classification were compared to the results from our experiments with the long short-term 
memory and multilayer perceptron GAN models. We used different combinations of 
network traffic from the datasets to train and evaluate these models. The test plan is 
described in Table 12, in which there are ten experiments. The experiments labeled with 
“A” were trained on the ICSICL dataset and the experiments labeled with “B” were trained 
on the IoT dataset. All ten experiments in Table 12 were applied to both the long short-






Table 12. Model Testing Plan 
Exp. Model Trained On 
Evaluated 
On Exp. Expected Result 
1A Standalone Discriminator  ICSICL ICSICL 





1B Standalone Discriminator  IoT IoT 
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We trained and evaluated the discriminators on each dataset in Experiment 1, then 
tested them with cross-dataset packets in Experiment 2. In Experiment 3, we trained the 
generator and discriminator of each GAN and saved their weights. In Experiment 4, we 
evaluated the GAN-trained discriminator (from Experiment 3) on the 20% test set of real 
data. In Experiment 5, we used the discriminator weights from Experiment 1 (which were 
evaluated on real benign and malicious packets) and the Experiment 3 generator weights. 
We generated a number of packets equal to the number of benign packets in the 20% test 
set for the discriminators’ test sets, and assessed whether they detected the generated 
instances.  
The training set size is 80% of the preprocessed packets for a given dataset. For 
each round of training, the selector provided data in 50-packet sequences, where 50 is our 
batch size. Therefore, the total observed instances for a given training session is the number 
of packets that were sampled from each dataset to train a model, given by  
training rounds * 50. Roughly speaking, the Experiment A series examined the ICSICL 
training data 10 times. The Experiment B series examined the same amount of traffic from 
the considerably larger IoT dataset.  
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. PRINCIPAL-COMPONENT ANALYSIS AND K-MEANS CLUSTERING 
The first experiment applied a two-part approach to analyze the ICSICL and IoT 
datasets. This approach was first used to explore the data, but the results also provide some 
justification for choosing a more sophisticated method like CPSGAN. We used principal-
component analysis (PCA) to reduce the datasets to two principal components, then 
clustered the transformed data using the K-Means algorithm.  
The K in K-Means is the number of target clusters. We chose a number of clusters 
equal to the number of traffic types in the tested dataset (ICSICL or IoT), which were 
identified by the collectors of the data. We assessed the quality of clusters by using the 
metrics described in Section IV.D.1. True positives for PCA followed by K-Means were 
the attack packets that were in their correct cluster. False positives were benign packets 
found in an attack cluster and false negatives were attack packets found in the benign 
cluster. Identification performance varied widely for the attack types, with some having 
high recall and some having high precision, but none were good on both metrics. 
For ICSICL, there were six clusters total covering the types of packets in the 
dataset: benign, FTP exfiltration, HTTP probe, physical manipulation of controls, and two 
denial-of-service exploits using the Register Session and Send Request/Reply Data 
commands. The highest recall recorded was 0.58 for the physical manipulation of controls, 
meaning that the K-Means algorithm correctly grouped this proportion of packets into the 
same attack cluster. The highest precision, 0.20, was recorded for the benign cluster, 
meaning this proportion of packets in benign cluster were truly benign packets. 
In total for ICSICL, K-Means clustered 10,726 true positives, 24,574 false 
negatives, and 20,006 false positives. Generalizing the attack clusters as “anomalous” gives 
us a precision of 0.35 and a recall of 0.30 for this dataset. The K-Means algorithm grouped 
many malicious ICSICL packets into the benign cluster (false negatives). The true traffic 
categories after PCA and the K-Means clusters are in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9. PCA and K-Means Clustering on the ICSICL Dataset (K=6) 
For the IoT dataset, there were ten clusters total: benign, ACK-flooding, ARP-
spoofing, host discovery, HTTP-flooding, OS-detection, port-scanning, SYN-flooding, 
telnet brute-force, and UDP-flooding  (Figure 10). Overall, the precision and recall for the 
benign cluster were 0.90 and 0.23 respectively. When treating the attack clusters as a single 
classification, the K-Means algorithm achieved a precision of 0.39 and a recall of 0.95. 
While the attack clusters captured much of the malicious traffic, they also contained a good 
amount of benign traffic. In total for the IoT dataset, the K-Means algorithm recorded 
674,492 true positives, 1,072,997 false negatives, and 37,531 false positives.  
 
Figure 10. PCA and K-Means Clustering on the IoT Dataset (K=10)  
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These results may be due to the IoT dataset being large and its benign traffic being 
diverse. The IoT dataset was taken on a network with several user devices and covers a 
broader range of protocols, so it is more heterogenous than the ICSICL dataset. This 
affected the readjustment of the cluster centers and increased the probability of overlap 
with attack data.  
B. CPSGAN RESULTS 
Testing CPSGAN focused on the discriminator’s performance with combinations 
of real benign, real malicious, and generated instances from the two datasets. Results are 
organized based on the architecture being tested (long short-term memory or multilayer 
perceptron) and the dataset used to train the model (ICSICL or IoT). Therefore, we tested 
four combinations of architecture and dataset: LSTM and ICSICL; LSTM and IoT; MLP 
and ICSICL; and MLP and IoT.  
The model test plan was described in Table 12 in Chapter IV. Unless stated 
otherwise, the training and testing sets are based on the 80/20 split of the dataset, 
determined at the start of Experiment 1. When interpreting the discriminators’ predictions, 
we used a threshold of 0.5 to define a “positive.” Predictions over this threshold were 
considered positives (malicious or generated). For the five experiments, we used the Scikit-
Learn package [68] for the receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) and precision-recall 
curve calculations and plotting. 
1. Experiment 1: Evaluation of the Discriminators on Real Data 
The first experiment individually evaluated the long short-term memory (LSTM) 
discriminator and the multilayer perceptron (MLP) discriminator in a supervised manner. 
Each discriminator trained on 500,000 packets from 80% of the dataset, then was evaluated 
on the remaining 20% after training concluded. The testing proportion of each dataset 
contained 12,350 packets for ICSICL or 422,300 packets for IoT. These parameters were 
chosen to expose the discriminators to an equal amount of traffic in Experiment 1, which 
set a basis for the rest of the experiments.  
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Table 13 shows the performance of each discriminator on classifying packets. True 
positives are malicious packets that the discriminator correctly classified as malicious; false 
positives are benign packets that the discriminator classified as malicious; and false 
negatives are malicious packets that the discriminator classified are benign. 
Table 13. Experiments 1A and 1B: Frequency Statistics of Standalone 
Discriminators  














1A LSTM ICSICL ICSICL 7785 52 5 12350 
1A MLP ICSICL ICSICL 7185 66 605 12350 
1B LSTM IoT IoT 138256 8418 4626 422300 
1B MLP IoT IoT 119735 6355 23147 422300 
 
Figure 11 shows the receiver-operating characteristic (ROC) curves of each 
architecture-dataset combination and the area under the curve, labeled “AUC.” The shaded 
regions of the plot are to visualize the AUC score of the model on a given dataset. The 
AUC score shown is a representation of how close the discriminator’s predicted 
probabilities are to the ground truth. The larger this area is, the better the AUC indicates 
good performance.   
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Figure 11. Experiments 1A and 1B: ROC Curves of Standalone 
Discriminators 
Figure 12 shows the precision-recall curves of each discriminator on the ICSICL 
and IoT datasets. Figure 12 also includes the average precision (labeled “AP”) between the 
discriminator’s predictions and the ground truth. Precision-recall curves describe the 
tradeoff between precision and recall at different thresholds. Here, they show that the MLP 
model struggled most on the IoT dataset in Experiment 1B, compared to the other three 
tests in Experiment 1. The LSTM model in Experiment 1A achieved the best results of the 
four tests. Overall, the discriminators achieve comparable results in the first experiment. 
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Figure 12. Experiments 1A and 1B: Precision-Recall Curves of the 
Standalone Discriminators 
2. Experiment 2: Evaluation of the Discriminators Across Datasets 
In Experiments 2A and 2B, we assessed whether the pretrained discriminators 
could detect traffic belonging to a different network. Networks have unique traffic 
signatures that would cause packet features to differ between datasets. The test sets of 
Experiments 2A and 2B selected benign packets from the 20% of the training dataset and 
selected an equal number of malicious packets from the other dataset, which contained 
network data that the model has not seen. For instance, if the model were trained on 
ICSICL, it was tested on a combination of reserved ICSICL and IoT data. 
Under the “Test Set” column in Table 14, two datasets are listed. To keep the 
number of benign and malicious packets balanced, we made the number of benign packets 
and the number of malicious packets equal in the test sets. The lack of true positives in 
Experiment 2B indicates that both the long short-term memory and multilayer perceptron 
models could not recognize any malicious packets. The models did better on the ICSICL 
51 
dataset than on the IoT dataset, which could be either because the ICSICL traffic is more 
repetitive than the IoT traffic or because the ICSICL dataset is significantly smaller. 
Table 14. Experiments 2A and 2B: Frequency Statistics of Standalone 
Discriminators on Combined Dataset 













2A LSTM ICSICL ICSICL + IoT 4051 52 499 9100 
2A MLP ICSICL ICSICL + IoT 2083 66 2467 9100 
2B LSTM IoT IoT + ICSICL 3 163 7747 15500 
2B MLP IoT IoT + ICSICL 38 148 7712 15500 
 
The LSTM adapted better to new IoT instances when first trained on ICSICL 
packets in Experiment 2A, but its performance decreased in Experiment 2B when trained 
on the IoT dataset and given ICSICL packets (Table 14). Both models did worse on the 
IoT dataset, especially in Experiment 2B. The MLP in Experiment 2B had worse 
performance than random guessing. This problem could be due to training neural networks 
in the absence of good training examples [14]. The MLP model’s tradeoff between recall 
for precision is nearly 2 to 1 (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. Experiments 2A and 2B: Precision-Recall Curves of Standalone 
Discriminators on Combined Dataset 
3. Experiment 3: Training CPSGAN and Analysis of Model Loss  
Experiments 3A and 3B studied CPSGAN’s training loss (error), which captures 
the stability and progression of learning. These experiments used the GAN-training 
algorithm described in Chapter IV, in which the discriminator and generator take turns 
training per iteration. Half of the discriminator’s training data were real instances from 
80% of the preprocessed dataset with malicious and benign labels. The other half were 
output from the generator and labeled as malicious.  
The MLP-GAN trained for 10,000 iterations, and the LSTM-GAN trained for 5,000 
iterations, due to resource constraints. For each training iteration, the generator was trained 
on 50 noise vectors and the discriminator was trained on 100 packets (50 real, 50 
generated). Therefore, the MLP generator trained on 500,000 noise vectors and the 
discriminator trained on 1,000,000 packets in total for a training session. The LSTM 
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generator and discriminator trained on 250,000 noise vectors and 500,000 packets 
respectively. 
In Experiment 3, we tracked the discriminator’s loss on real packets, its loss metric 
on fake packets, its average loss on real and fake packets, and the generator’s loss. We 
compared the discriminator’s losses on real and fake packets in Figures 14 and 16, where 
fake packets were made by the generator. Using these losses, we computed the 
discriminator’s average loss and compared this to the generator’s loss (Figures 15 and 17). 
Note that the discriminator’s losses on fake packets reflect the degree to which the 
generator successfully tricked the discriminator during training. Note that the Keras 
application programming interface negates and returns loss values after training a network, 
so loss values are shown as positive in Experiment 3 results. 
a. Long Short-Term Memory CPSGAN Training 
The LSTM model had inconsistent behavior across experiments. Figure 14 shows 
the discriminator’s averaged loss on a batch of real or fake packets per iteration of GAN 
training. Spikes in Figure 14 indicate when the discriminator (D) had trouble with real or 
generated instances. On the left (ICSICL), the discriminator was initially confused between 
real and fake packets, then showed decreasing loss on the generator’s fake packets. This is 
strange behavior but could be due to dual-meaning labels (fake and malicious). The 
discriminator’s losses in Experiment 3B are more consistent with our expected result, but 
no clear improvement occurs. 
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Figure 14. Experiments 3A and 3B: LSTM Discriminator Losses on Real and 
Fake Data  
 Figure 15 shows how the losses of the discriminator (D) and generator (G) relate 
during training. In Experiment 3A (left), a big change occurred around the 1,000th training 
iteration. After this, the generator’s loss climbed steadily. The Experiment 3B network 
losses on the IoT dataset (right) show that the generator diverged from the discriminator. 
At the same time, the generator made some lucky guesses, indicated by the sudden 
decreases in its losses during training. 
 
Figure 15. Experiments 3A and 3B: LSTM Discriminator and Generator 
Losses 
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b. Multilayer Perceptron CPSGAN Training 
The MLP-GAN’s training was more balanced than the LSTM-GAN. The loss 
graphs in Figure 16 indicate that the generator succeeded in confusing the discriminator at 
certain periods over time. The discriminator was relatively unfazed with fake ICSICL 
packets until the end of the training session (3A, late in training around the 10,000th 
iteration). The generator performed better when the discriminator was confused. The 
discriminator showed more consistent losses on fake IoT packets (right, Experiment 3B).  
 
 
Figure 16. Experiments 3A and 3B: MLP Discriminator Losses on Real and 
Fake Data 
For the  MLP architecture in Figure 17, particularly in the right graph of Experiment 
3B (IoT), the generator and discriminator losses showed early signs of convergence, though 
the generator’s loss was increasing overall. The Experiment 3A loss graph in Figure 17 
(left,  ICSICL) show that the MLP-GAN struggled to converge on ICSICL data when 
compared to the Experiment 3B.The MLP generator in Experiment 3A recorded the highest 
loss of the Experiment 3 evaluations, exceeding a value of 7. This indicates that it had a 
hard time during training. 
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Figure 17. Experiments 3A and 3B: MLP Discriminator and Generator Losses  
4. Experiment 4: Evaluation of GAN-Trained Discriminators on Real 
Data 
For Experiments 4A and 4B, we evaluated the Experiment 3 discriminators on 20% 
of the real dataset reserved for testing and this contained both benign and malicious 
instances. Table 15 shows the number of true positives, false positives, and false negatives 
that each discriminator made on the datasets. In Table 16, the LSTM discriminator of 
Experiment 4A predicted that all packets in the ICSICL test set were malicious, but the 
MLP model showed improved performance. Metrics that improved from Experiment 1 are 
in bold in Table 16. 
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Table 15. Experiments 4A and 4B: Frequency Statistics of GAN-Trained 
Discriminators 




































(real) 119632 12341 23250 422300 
 
Table 16. Experiments 4A and 4B: Performance Metrics of GAN-Trained 
Discriminators 

































(real) 0.916 0.837 0.906 0.871 0.044 
 
The precision-recall curves in Figure 18 show that the Experiment 4A 
discriminator’s average precision (AP) was high, despite its high false-positive rate and 
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low F1-score. The tradeoff between precision and recall is steeper for the MLP model on 
the IoT dataset than the other models in Experiments 4A and 4B. 
 
 
Figure 18. Experiments 4A and 4B: Precision-Recall Curves for GAN-
Trained Discriminators 
5. Experiment 5: Evaluation of Pretrained Standalone Discriminators on 
Generated Data 
For this experiment, we reused the discriminator weights learned in Experiments 
1A and 1B, where each discriminator was trained as a binary classifier on the benign and 
malicious packets of a dataset. In Experiments 5A and 5B, half of the testing data were 
benign packets pulled from the 20% of the dataset reserved for testing, and the other half 
were supplied by the trained generator from Experiments 3A and 3B. The generated 
packets were given malicious labels. This experiment tested how a trained neural network 
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classifier responded to packets from the generator, as it was trying to mimic anomalous 
packets from the same network.  
In Experiment 5A of Table 17, the LSTM model detected 4545 of the 4550 
generated ICSICL packets in the combined dataset, which is better than the MLP model. 
In Experiment 5B, the LSTM recorded many false negatives and was fooled by over 99% 
of the generated IoT instances in the test set. On the other hand, the MLP discriminator 
recorded much fewer false negatives, so it did significantly better in Experiment 5B than 
the LSTM discriminator.  
Table 17. Experiments 5A and 5B: Frequency Statistics of Standalone 
Discriminators Evaluated on Benign and Generated Data 

















4545 52 5 9100 
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The results in Table 18 suggest that each GAN architecture, MLP or LSTM, has 
advantages in certain kinds of datasets when it comes to packet generation. The LSTM-
generated ICSICL instances had a negligible effect on the LSTM discriminator’s 
performance in Experiment 5A. Of the ICSICL packets produced by the MLP generator, 
about 38% fooled the MLP discriminator in Experiment 5A. As a result, the MLP 
discriminator lost almost 15% to accuracy and 33% to recall from Experiment 1A. Its 
decreased recall was due to a higher number of false negatives. Performance in Experiment 
5B improved for the MLP discriminator, which could distinguish the fake packets easily. 
In contrast, the LSTM discriminator’s accuracy decreased from 96.9% (Experiment 1B) to 
less than 50% when generated packets were introduced. Its F1-score, recall, and precision 
from Experiment 1B were also significantly reduced. 
Table 18. Experiments 5A and 5B: Performance Metrics of the Standalone 
Discriminators Evaluated on Generated Data 











5A LSTM ICSICL  (real) 
ICSICL  
(real + generated) 0.994 0.999 0.989 0.994 0.011 
5A MLP ICSICL  (real) 
ICSICL  
(real + generated) 0.802 0.619 0.977 0.758 0.015 
5B LSTM IoT  (real) 
IoT  
(real + generated) 0.486 0.003 0.079 0.005 0.030 
5B MLP IoT  (real) 
IoT  
(real + generated) 0.966 0.955 0.977 0.966 0.023 
 
Figure 19 shows the precision-recall curves of each model on each dataset. The 
effect of the generated instances on the MLP discriminator in Experiment 5A is clearer 
when compared to the curves of the Experiment 5A LSTM and Experiment 5B MLP, which 




Figure 19. Experiments 5A and 5B: Precision-Recall of the Experiment 1 
Discriminators Evaluated on Generated Data 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
CPSGAN was motivated by the need for robust intrusion-detection mechanisms in 
cyber-physical systems. We used a supervised clustering approach and two semi-
supervised GAN models: a long short-term memory (LSTM) network and multilayer 
perceptron (MLP). Each model was a binary classifier designed to detect anomalous traffic. 
We analyzed each model in their ability to detect attack packets in the ICSICL and IoT 
datasets, and the design appeared promising. It is possible for a GAN-based approach to 
improve classifier-based intrusion-detection methods. 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Our results show that GANs could improve intrusion-detection systems for 
detecting anomalous CPS traffic. They are versatile in that any architecture or loss function 
can be used, but they come with different constraints and challenges [34].  
We achieved significantly different results across experiments, possibly due to the 
effect each type of network traffic had on each model during training. Experiment 1 gave 
us a basis of performance for each model-dataset combination. Experiment 2 showed that 
it is harder to detect unknown packets either when the training data is more heterogenous 
or has fewer features as in the IoT dataset. Experiments 3 and 4 indicated that it is possible 
for GAN-based training to improve classifier performance, as was the case with the MLP 
on ICSICL and LSTM on IoT tests. In Experiment 5, we concluded from the decreased 
performance of the standalone-trained discriminators (MLP on ICSICL and LSTM on IoT) 
that the generators from Experiment 3 could generate packets that fooled the two 
discriminators. In summary, two of our model-dataset combinations achieved the expected 
result.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
Possible future work could use a convolutional neural network in the design of 
CPSGAN. This would permit traffic to be preprocessed as an image with early layers 
having local focus [8], [19], [25], [74]. Convolutional neural networks can be used for both 
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the discriminator and generator, or combined with long short-term memory architecture. 
Many examples of this architecture have been tried in intrusion-detection  
research [13], [14], [30]. 
Another possible type of GAN is the Wasserstein GAN (WGAN), which uses 
Wasserstein distance to train the GAN [33]. Wasserstein distance treats the discriminator 
as a “critic.” Instead of providing a probability of realness, the critic measures how real a 
sample seems. Wasserstein loss helps when we wish to stabilize training between the 
discriminator and generator. By providing a critique of realness, versus a classification, the 
gradients from Wasserstein loss tell the generator how far from the ground truth its 
generated output is. This way, the GAN is less likely to suffer from convergence failures 
during training, though this may cause slower training. 
A LSTM-GAN network may benefit from a complex embedding structure and 
training algorithm to support backpropagation. It may be worth investigating and adapting 
models like the SeqGAN [75] and the MaskGAN [76]. A useful approach for input 
encoding is the Global Vectors for Word Representation (GloVe) training algorithm, which 
is an unsupervised method for numerically encoding words [68]. A similar approach has 
already been done specifically for packet data, called Packet2Vec [77]. 
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APPENDIX A.  CIP TRAFFIC EXAMPLES 
Wireshark provides a graphical user interface for network traffic analysis.  
Figure 20 shows an example in Wireshark of normal CIP communications between two 
devices in the ICSICL testbed. These packets show device status updates. Note that this 
traffic is very repetitive.  
Figure 20. Example of Benign CIP Traffic 
Figure 21 shows traffic from a denial-of-service attack using the Register Session 
command, which caused a silent shutdown of the PLC. An attacker at IP address 10.1.40.1 
continuously sent Register Session requests to the PLC at 100.1.100.2, and the PLC 
responded to each request by producing a unique session ID, called a Session Handle. The 
opened sessions were not terminated, which eventually exhausted the PLC’s session ID 
pool, causing it to stop responding to new Register Session requests.  
66 
 
Figure 21. Denial of Service Using the Register Session Command 
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APPENDIX B.  WIRESHARK FILTERS 
TShark is the command-line interface for the packet analysis and capture tool 
Wireshark. Filter rules are logical statements passed to the Wireshark application 
programming interface and are for filtering packets of a specific characteristic [78]. The 
following filter rules are examples of rules for identifying attack packets from a PCAP file: 
Host discovery: 
(eth.src == f0:18:98:5e:ff:9f 
and arp 
and eth.dst == ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff) 
and frame.number < 13000 
Port discovery: 
ip.src == 192.168.0.15  
and ip.dst == 192.168.0.13 
and ( (tcp.flags.syn == 1  
and tcp.window_size == 1024)  
or tcp.flags.reset == 1) 
 
The host discovery rule identifies ARP broadcast packets from the attacking device 
within the first 13,000 packets captured of that PCAP. The port discovery rule looks for 
packets with the TCP SYN flag set and specified window size or packets with TCP RST 
flag set, sent from 192.168.0.15 to 192.168.0.13.  
When these filters are applied, Wireshark will iterate through a PCAP file and show 
only packets that match this condition. Using TShark and a write file command option, the 
preprocessor applies each filter to its associated PCAP file and stores the resulting packets 
into a new PCAP file. Figure 22 shows how a rule appears if run through a command-line 
interpreter (PowerShell in this case). 
 
Figure 22. Application of a TShark Rule in a Command-line Interface 
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The preprocessor called TShark with the ‘-n’ and ‘-r’ options to disable name 
resolution and read from the PCAP file named scan-hostport-1-dec.pcap. The file we want 
to read, scan-hostport-1-dec.pcap, was defined after these options. The ‘-F pcap -w’ option 
tells TShark to write output to a PCAP file named port-scanning0.pcap, followed by the 
filter rule surrounded by quotes. The filter rule in Figure 22 was written by the IoT dataset’s 
creators. 
For a PCAP file with only one attack, we isolated benign packets by encapsulating 
the attack rule in parentheses and appending “not” to the beginning of the rule. For a PCAP 
file with multiple attacks, we joined the multiple attack rules with an “or” operator and 
then apply the “not’ and parenthesis to the combined attack rule. A simple example of this 
process is shown in Table 19. 
Table 19. Creating a Benign Filter from Multiple Attack Filters 
Attack Rule 1 (ip.addr == 10.1.40.1) 
Attack Rule 2 (frame.number > 2000) 
Benign Rule not ((ip.addr == 10.1.40.1) or (frame.number > 2000)) 
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APPENDIX C.  CPSGAN MODELS 
# *************************************************************** 
#  
# Long Short-Term Memory models 
#  
# *************************************************************** 
from tensorflow.keras import Input 
from tensorflow.keras.layers import Flatten 
from tensorflow.keras.layers import Dense 
from tensorflow.keras.layers import LSTM 
from tensorflow.keras.layers import Bidirectional 
from tensorflow.keras.layers import Embedding 
from tensorflow.keras.models import Model 
 
#    D I S C R I M I N A T O R  
def build_discriminator(b, m): 
    d_shape = (m, 256) 
    d_batch = (b, m, 256) 
     
    x = Input(batch_input_shape=d_batch) 
    h = Bidirectional(LSTM(128, input_shape=d_shape, return_sequences=True))(x) 
    h = LSTM(80, return_sequences=True)(h) 
    h = Flatten()(h) 
    h = Dense(2, activation='tanh')(h) 
    out = Dense(1, activation='sigmoid')(h) 
    model = Model(x, out, name='LSTM_Discriminator') 
    return model, d_shape, d_batch 
 
#     G E N E R A T O R 
def build_generator(b, m): 
    g_shape = (m, 256) 
    g_batch = (b, *g_shape) 
 
    z = Input(batch_input_shape=g_batch) 
    h = Bidirectional(LSTM(128, input_shape=g_shape, return_sequences=True))(z) 
    Gz = Dense(256, activation='relu')(h) 
    model = Model(z, Gz, name='LSTM_Generator') 






#   MultiLayer Perceptron Models 
#  
# *************************************************************** 
from tensorflow.keras import Input 
from tensorflow.keras.layers import Dense 
from tensorflow.keras.layers import Activation 
from tensorflow.keras.layers import BatchNormalization 
from tensorflow.keras.layers import Dropout 
from tensorflow.keras.models import Model 
 
#    D I S C R I M I N A T O R  
def build_discriminator(b, m): 
    d_shape = (m,) 
    d_batch = (b, m,) 
 
    x = Input(batch_input_shape=d_batch) 
    h = Dense(100, activation='relu')(x) 
    h = Dense(200, activation='relu')(h) 
    h = Dense(400, activation='relu')(h) 
    h = Dense(200, activation='relu')(h) 
    h = Dense(100, activation='relu')(h) 
    h = Dense(m, activation='relu')(h) 
    out = Dense(2, activation='tanh')(h) 
    Dx = Dense(1, activation='sigmoid')(out) 
    model = Model(x, Dx, name='MLP_Discriminator') 
    return model, d_shape, d_batch 
 
#     G E N E R A T O R 
def build_generator(b, m): 
    g_shape = (m,) 
    g_batch = (b, *g_shape) 
 
    z = Input(batch_input_shape=g_batch) 
    h = Dense(100, activation='relu', input_dim=g_shape)(z)    
    h = BatchNormalization(momentum=0.8)(h) 
    h = Dense(200, activation='relu')(h) 
    h = BatchNormalization(momentum=0.8)(h) 
    h = Dense(400, activation='relu')(h) 
    h = BatchNormalization(momentum=0.8)(h) 
    h = Dense(200, activation='relu')(h) 
    h = BatchNormalization(momentum=0.8)(h) 
    h = Dense(100, activation='relu')(h) 
    h = BatchNormalization(momentum=0.8)(h) 
    h = Dense(50, activation='relu')(h) 
    h = BatchNormalization(momentum=0.8)(h) 
    Gz = Dense(m, activation='tanh')(h) 
    model = Model(z, Gz, name='MLP_Generator') 
    return model, g_shape, g_batch 
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